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## SOME EFFECTS OF OUTLYING DEPENDENCIES UPON THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

BY HENRY C. MORRIS,  
OF CHICAGO.

A nation, in its immaturity, is prone to look only at the more apparent features of its existence; as it grows in power it views with complacency the respect paid to its prowess, the authority which it is able to enforce and the volume of commerce it maintains. By its conduct and attitude the policies of foreign states are fixed; its navy controls the seas; its army threatens its neighbors; its merchants roam through the more remote quarters of the earth; its legislators establish laws for multitudes without its borders; its ambassadors are consulted at every Court; its rulers gain the regard and affection of rival potentates and princes. How to achieve these results, so patent to the observer, forms the theme of many arguments; but how few of the people realize what obligations and effects are reciprocally imposed upon them themselves; how their development, temperament and institutions may be varied, favored or thwarted by their relations with foreign states.

In a somewhat different degree and in directions which, in various instances, have been diametrically opposite, the administration of colonial possessions has in due time affected the legislation, the morals, the tendencies and the character of every nation owning them. Can the United States, lately undertaking similar enterprises, however disguised in name, claim to be exempt from the rule? Such a question might be fairly answered in the negative. Assuming, therefore, that there will not be any exception from the usual consequences in this respect, what are some of the more general effects which the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii, Guam and Panama will exert upon the home country irrespective of their legal or constitutional relationship, as determined by the Supreme

Court, and consequently without regard to the nature of the tie by which they are bound?

Although the results respectively arising from the control of dependencies, differing in geographical situation, may in detail be widely divergent, they are in the general sense strikingly along similar lines; in each individual case emphasis may perhaps be laid on some particular feature, but the same tendency persists. Possession or authority presupposes a certain relationship and beyond the mere reasons for acquisition,—which may have been momentary, although durable in results—some cause for prevailing conditions. Heretofore there has always existed between mother country and colony some bond of sympathy; a feeling of deep interest on the part of the paramount state or its people. In every age the desire for commercial supremacy, military renown, national prestige, religious freedom and political liberty, or, conversely, escape from intellectual or physical servitude has been a moving force to colonizing effort; as one or the other has predominated, the effects have varied. Can it yet be said what motives lie at the root of American energy in distant lands? Are our people purely philanthropic? Are they mainly ambitious of extending the national domain, or are they attracted by the more sordid calculations of financial gain? To what extent are these aims fixed or changing and how far are they conscious or voluntary? In time of war and physical conflict the impulses of rulers and people are sharply defined and clearly enunciated, but after the stress and storm they inevitably become more complex and less apparent. The masses, in a large measure, lose their volition and leaving the direction of affairs more and more to those charged with their administration, they unconsciously drift as circumstances of domestic and foreign policy necessitate. A people, apparently moved in the first instance solely by aspirations for religious or political liberty, may soon fall a victim to commercial ambition or to the race for wealth; witness the example of Spain in the sixteenth century and England two hundred years later; indeed, the original economic causes for colonization have too often been disguised under the

enthusiasm of the fervent churchman or political philosopher. The mainsprings of many such movements of the past have only in recent years been properly recognized and credited with their due importance. Let us not now deceive ourselves in our own contemporaneous history, but let us rather remember that sufficient time has not yet elapsed properly to observe conditions with impartiality and completely to judge of the results. In colonial enterprises the modification of ideals is in itself one of the most characteristic effects. The United States is now apparently in a stage of transition; ten years ago few persons would have admitted that a war would be fought with a foreign power for the extension of markets for our products and manufactures; and even to-day the fact that such was the underlying cause for the conflict with Spain would be reluctantly conceded; while indeed the national consciousness of such a motive at that time can be truthfully denied, nevertheless, among the manifest results, next to the increase in area and population, the expansion of our trade relations is the most apparent.

The statistics of trade between the United States and foreign countries as given by "Commercial America in 1905," a publication prepared under the direction of O. P. Austin, Chief of the Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Commerce and Labor, show a very material growth in the volume of business transacted during the preceding ten years. When the figures for certain special localities are examined, the effects of our recent development are peculiarly evident. Considering in the first place, the trade with our newly acquired dependencies and Cuba, it appears that the imports into the United States were as follows:

	1895.	1905.
Philippines.....	\$4,731,000	\$12,658,000
Porto Rico.....	1,506,500	15,633,000
Hawaii.....	7,889,000	36,112,000
Total.....	\$14,126,000	\$64,403,000
Cuba.....	52,871,000	86,304,000
Grand total.....	\$66,997,000	\$150,707,000

On the other hand, the exports from the United States were:

	1895.	1905.
Philippines.....	\$119,000	\$6,200,000
Porto Rico.....	1,884,000	13,974,020
Hawaii.....	3,723,000	11,753,000
Total.....	\$5,726,000	\$31,927,000
Cuba.....	12,807,000	38,380,000
Grand total.....	\$18,633,000	\$70,307,000

Pursuing the inquiry still further and investigating this time the status of our trade with the two principal independent powers of the Orient, it appears that their imports into the United States have been:

	1895.	1905.
Chinese Empire.....	\$20,546,000	\$27,885,000
Japan.....	23,696,000	51,822,000
Total.....	\$44,242,000	\$79,707,000

The exports from the United States were:

	1895.	1905.
Chinese Empire.....	\$3,604,000	\$53,453,000
Japan.....	4,635,000	51,720,000
Total.....	\$8,239,000	\$105,173,000

It is apparent that our trade has not only been growing with the flag but far beyond it; nor has foreign soil formed a serious barrier to its development in other portions of the far East. Let us cite some further statistics, as for example for British and Dutch possessions; first for imports into the United States:

	1895.	1905.
Hong Kong.....	\$776,500	\$1,552,000
British Australia.....	4,621,000	11,893,000
British East Indies.....	21,266,000	53,690,000
Dutch East Indies.....	7,727,000	18,463,000

The exports for the same period from the United States:

	1895.	1905.
Hong Kong.....	\$4,253,000	\$10,770,000
British Australia.....	9,014,000	26,353,000
British East Indies.....	2,854,000	7,548,000
Dutch East Indies.....	1,147,000	1,670,000

It would therefore appear that the extension of our influence in the Pacific has not merely opened up markets under the protection of our own flag and laws, but has done infinitely more in developing the demand for our products, both on the part of independent peoples and colonists of other powers. Incidentally, it may here be noticed that the tonnage of American owned vessels on the Pacific Coast increased from 433,502 tons in 1895 to 821,710 tons in 1905. While this growth is relatively larger than that for Atlantic and Gulf ports, it is regrettable that the greater portion of this trade should still be carried in foreign bottoms.

Aside, however, from the slow growth of the merchant marine, the commercial achievements of Americans in the Orient during the last ten years may, comparatively speaking, be termed stupendous, although even yet we control only a very small share of the total trade and considerably less than under all the circumstances we should have. While of course without the consequences of the war with Spain there would have been some natural progress; while the forward movement of China and Japan would to a certain extent have drawn our attention in their direction, while perhaps, certain modifications in the tariff may have contributed somewhat to the results; while the Boer war may have crippled for a time our greatest competitor; while possibly Germany might be cited as a country the trade of which has developed without the impulse of war and prosperous colonial possessions, and while Americans might have participated in Chinese trade without sending their troops to assist in the rescue of the foreign legations at Peking, still it is extremely doubtful if, without the stimulus inspired by the broader view of the world, gained by our military and naval experience, coupled with the acquisition of new territories, we should have accomplished any results in eastern trade comparable to those actually achieved.

The same tendency has likewise been felt nearer home; for instance, examine for a moment the course of trade with our neighbors immediately to the North and to the South. Their imports into the United States were:

	1895.	1905.
Mexico.....	\$15,636,000	\$46,471,000
Canada.....	36,574,000	62,470,000

Their exports from the United States were:

	1895.	1905.
Mexico.....	\$15,006,000	\$45,756,000
Canada.....	52,855,000	140,530,000

Throughout all the tables, next to the enormous percentage of increase, the most significant facts to be noted are the relative proportions of imports and exports in each particular group. In the case of the dependencies the imports into this country are uniformly in excess of the exports; while in other instances, the exports are usually the larger. While reference to the details of European trade, would be extraneous, it may be of interest to note that in the period of which we are speaking, the imports of Spain into the United States increased, notwithstanding the interruption occasioned by the war, from \$3,575,000 to \$11,654,000 in value; while the exports to that country grew from \$10,927,000 to \$17,038,000.

Before concluding this discussion of commercial development, it appears necessary to quote one more table summarizing the growth of our trade relations with the various grand divisions of the world.

## IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES.

<i>Country.</i>	<i>1895.</i>	<i>Percentage of total trade.</i>	<i>1905.</i>	<i>Percentage of total trade.</i>
Europe.....	\$383,646,000	52.41	\$540,773,000	48.39
North America.	133,916,000	18.29	227,229,000	20.33
Asia.....	77,626,000	10.61	161,983,000	14.50
South America.	112,167,000	15.32	150,796,000	13.49
Oceania.....	17,451,000	2.39	25,388,500	2.27
Africa.....	5,709,000	.98	11,344,000	1.02

## EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES.

<i>Country.</i>	<i>1895.</i>	<i>Percentage of total trade.</i>	<i>1905.</i>	<i>Percentage of total trade.</i>
Europe.....	\$627,928,000	77.76	\$1,020,973,000	67.23
North America.	108,575,000	13.45	260,570,000	17.16
Asia.....	17,325,000	2.15	128,505,000	8.46
South America.	33,526,000	4.15	56,894,000	3.75
Oceania.....	13,109,000	1.62	33,079,000	2.18
Africa.....	7,075,000	.87	18,541,000	1.22

The study of these figures is significant; while in every instance of course, there has actually been a large increase during ten years, both in imports and exports, the relative proportions of the various localities indicate striking changes highly important to us when deciding upon our attitude for the future. In both European and South American trade relative losses have been sustained; the ratio of imports from Europe in the total has declined from 52.41 per cent to 48.39 per cent; that of the exports to Europe from 77.76 to 67.23 per cent. In the case of South America the decline in imports has been from 15.32 to 13.49 per cent; in the exports, from 4.15 to 3.75 per cent. In every other instance the ratio is increasing; that of the imports of other countries of North America into the United States has risen from 18.29 to 20.33 per cent; that of the exports from the United States to them, from 13.45 to 17.16 per cent. In the Asiatic trade the increase in imports into the United States has been from 10.61 to 14.50 per cent; in exports from the United States from 2.15 to 8.46 per cent. In the trade with Oceania and Africa the respective ratio to the total is also generally larger. With these conclusions before us we should be able readily to perceive where our greatest advantage lies in building up and fostering trade relations. It certainly behooves us as a nation especially to nurture our interests in those regions where they are rapidly developing.

In discussing this subject Secretary Shaw has lately said:

“Where shall these new markets be found? The answer is easy, for there are few places possible; South America and South Africa import \$650,000,000 per annum, of which the



United States contributes a paltry 12 per cent. Oriental countries import a thousand millions, of which the United States contributes only 10 per cent.

"Our manufacturing competitors know where these countries lie. They have learned their languages, have studied their desires as well as their needs, and for years have prosecuted a well-planned and well-executed campaign for their commercial invasion, and with the aid of a large merchant marine they have been successful. We scarcely know where these countries are on the map. We do not understand their languages, their habits, their needs or their desires, and we send them, all combined, less than \$150,000,000 of our more than \$13,000,000,000 of manufactures, and this pittance we send in foreign bottoms and beneath alien flags.

"Let no man misunderstand me," he continues. "I admire the forethought, the enterprise and the skill of our foreign competitors, and I bid them all godspeed. No prosperity can come to any country that does not gladden my heart. I am contending only that we shall emulate their enterprise and enter these markets with American ships laden with goods especially designed to meet the desires of the people as distinguished from our conception of what they ought to have. Every day we delay hastens the day when our surplus will set back upon us like a belated tide, to the inundation and swamping of our prosperity, which is now our boast." Such is Secretary Shaw's opinion.

The most deplorable feature in the commercial situation of the nation for many years has been and still is, the weakness of the merchant marine. The people of the United States long ago lost and have well-nigh forgotten their early glory as a sea-faring race. At one time they carried ninety per cent of their exports in their own ships; now they control only nine per cent and allow the other ninety-one per cent to be delivered at their destination by foreign craft. Secretary Root in a recent speech at Kansas City, before the Trans-Mississippi Congress, in explaining the reasons for this condition, well said:

"1. The higher wages and the greater cost of maintenance of American officers and crews make it impossible to compete on

equal terms with foreign ships. The scale of living and the scale of pay of American sailors is fixed by the standard of wages and of living in the United States, and these are maintained at a high level by the protective tariff. The moment the American passes beyond the limits of his country and engages in ocean transportation he comes into competition with the lower foreign scale of wages and of living.

"2. The principal maritime nations of the world, anxious to develop their trade, to promote their ship-building industry, to have at hand transports and auxiliary cruisers in case of war, are fostering their steamship lines by the payment of subsidies. Against these advantages of his competitor the American ship-owner has to contend. And it is manifest that the subsidized ship can afford to carry freight at cost for a long enough period to drive him out of business. We are living in a world not of natural competition, but of subsidized competition. State aid to steamship lines is as much a part of the commercial system of our day as state employment of consuls to promote business. Plainly these disadvantages created by governmental action can be neutralized only by governmental action, and should be neutralized by such action."

Upon the same occasion the distinguished Secretary of the Treasury likewise said:

"If this country ever develops international merchants it will accomplish it by granting them encouragement, not alone by dredging harbors and deepening channels, but by assuring them a merchant marine in which to carry, under most favorable terms, the products of our farms, our mines, our forests and our factories. And without international merchants sustained by a merchant marine we will never put these products into the ports of countries unable to maintain merchant ships with which to come after them.

"A fraction of the amount, \$465,000,000, spent in the last decade on the Isthmian Canal, on rivers and harbors, in aid of shipping and on the revenue-cutter service would give us what we once had," Secretary Shaw concluded,—“a merchant marine—and assure us international merchants. The products of our ever-increasing labor would then be carried where the United States as a commercial country is now unknown.”

The President himself in his last message strongly urges the passage of the ship-subsidy bill now pending in Congress. To those who have the welfare of our oversea possessions at heart, the subject must be of deep and abiding interest. The requirements of colonial commerce will, without doubt, enlist and train up a body of seamen peculiarly adapted to it; the ordinary development incidental to the progress of our outlying territories will in time give a renewed impulse to the American merchant marine, while on the other hand, with its rapid and regular expansion the prosperity of these regions is intimately associated. Whatever method therefore may eventually be adopted for the purpose, the restoration of a proper share of the ocean carrying trade to the flag is of paramount importance.

Contemporaneously with the extension of our commerce, we are slowly preparing to work out a new economic system. With the control of the fiscal regulations, both for producer and consumer in our hands it has been discovered,—at least by those who are sufficiently enlightened to recognize the fact—that arbitrary rules will not change the natural course of trade; that where we wish to sell, we must buy; that if we would buy we must not surround ourselves with artificial barriers which restrict the egress of our own goods as much as the ingress of colonial products. We are gradually learning that the admission of the staple products of the dependencies upon the markets of this country inevitably promotes the prosperity of their producers, renders them better able to care for themselves, reduces our expenditures on their behalf, increases the sales of our own merchandise to them and especially, above every other consideration, fosters a more friendly feeling on their part toward us. This discussion indeed would scarcely be complete without a suggestion of the breach, which will probably be made in our tariff doctrines by the exigencies of colonial trade; coincident with this tendency will undoubtedly be the competition which certain existing monopolies will meet. On the other hand, the cheapness of labor in the dependencies is likely to impair the higher rate of wages at home and seriously to endanger the existence of labor organizations.

Whether results of such an opposite character in the social order will be unequivocally beneficial to the community cannot yet be foretold.

Another condition, purely financial, can be anticipated, if it has not already been experienced; so long at least as a dependency is in a large measure undeveloped, considerable sums of money necessarily flow to it; the needs of the government alone for administrative purposes do not limit the amount. Commercial, agricultural, educational and philanthropic enterprises draw their funds from the parent state and to the extent of their requirements reduce the resources available for domestic and other purposes. In some degree the United States is now feeling the effects of the demands which the Philippines, Cuba and Hawaii are directly or indirectly making upon its currency. Granting even that the appropriations in the budgets of the dependencies are covered by local taxation, there are several millions of American capital engaged in private colonial investments. How much has been diverted from circulation abroad and what surplus, if any, is naturally seeking an outlet from the country are perhaps open questions.

Upon this subject Secretary Root says:

"Since the first election of President McKinley the people of the United States have accumulated for the first time a surplus of capital beyond the requirements of internal development. We have paid our debts to Europe and have become a creditor instead of a debtor nation. We have faced about.

"Our surplus energy is beginning to look beyond our own borders, throughout the world, to find opportunity for the profitable use of our surplus capital, foreign markets for our manufactures, foreign mines to be developed, foreign bridges, railroads and public works to be built, foreign rivers to be turned into electric power and light."

Basing our conclusions upon this authoritative statement of the facts, can there be any doubt that such an excess is preferably and more safely invested under the protection of our own flag and laws in such opportunities as the dependencies

afford, than if it were subjected to the uncertainties of alien sovereignty and legislation?

The American people who solved its difficulties with the aborigines by their practical annihilation and endeavored on the other hand to settle the negro question by elevating the blacks to its own level, is again confronted in the Philippines by a race problem, the more serious as it is the more complex. Shall we, in this instance, annihilate the natives of the soil or eventually raise them politically and intellectually to our standards? The first solution by reason of their numbers is not probable; is the latter possible? Has not our experience with an inferior race of the East already shaken our ideal of the potential equality of all men? Has not the experiment—so far very brief but still likely long to endure,—had a reflex action on our attitude toward the negro? Have not the enthusiasm and ardor of ante-bellum and civil war days for his political, social and educational equality,—so greatly cooled in the succeeding forty years—been seriously chilled by the events occurring during the last decade in the Pacific and nearer at home in the Gulf of Mexico? While every effort should be made to grant equal justice to all citizens, irrespective of color or race and all should have our deepest sympathy and profound assistance in their struggles and aspirations, such questions may well and reasonably be propounded and their ultimate answers confided to the men of a subsequent generation.

What influence, if any, it may also well be asked, will the control of races in the dependencies have upon our theories of government and their application to our domestic affairs? At the time of the Revolution the inhabitants of the thirteen colonies were chiefly of European origin. With the exception of the negro factor, the growth of which precipitated the problems of the Civil War, the influx of individuals of alien race—I do not mean nationality—has, throughout our history been slight; as a people we have been homogeneous. Indeed the fear of contamination is evidenced by the laws against miscegenation and in its most patent form by the Chinese exclusion act; but now in the Philippines, the task

of absorbing into our body politic and social many tribes of Malay blood is imposed. Admitting the eventual adoption of a form of control beneficial to them, will not our own views of government ultimately be modified, even perhaps involuntarily, by contact with them. In the organization of our colonial administration we have, naturally, followed a course peculiar to ourselves; in general, we have disregarded the methods elsewhere in force and devised our own system. Whether or not the results already achieved are satisfactory is not here at issue, except in so far as experience shall hereafter cause a change. The idea of government by legislative control has prevailed; the affairs of a dependency in the tropics have for once been placed under the direction of a commission directly subject in turn to the action of an elective body several thousand miles away. In the ultimate reservation of power to Congress, in which the inhabitants of the Philippines have no representation and irrespective of constitutional limitations, we are challenging failure, such as Spain met in South America and Cuba, and Great Britain at an earlier date encountered in the American colonies. Should success be achieved, we shall, as a nation, have demonstrated greater capacity for colonial administration than any of our predecessors. The existence of such misgivings nevertheless, does not necessarily imply the establishment of an Insular Legislature, either of the type of that which is about to be inaugurated in the Philippines or to which a practically independent form of government shall be granted; they rather involve a change in our own point of view; the withdrawal from or renunciation by Congress of the greater part of its authority; the creation of a special colonial office; the transfer of the executive power in the islands from a body of men with divided obligations to a single individual charged with the highest degree of responsibility and aided by a select council. But in arriving at this solution our ideals of popular government, as heretofore cherished, would be grievously shattered. Such a revulsion of sentiment might readily effect a reaction at home; so that not only in Asia, but likewise in America, unexpected but not irrational application might be made.

Long before any such radical change takes place, the influence of the returning thousands of our soldiers and sailors will be felt. The experience gained by them will naturally broaden the scope of their observation; knowledge of the wider field of military and naval achievement cannot fail to impart to their friends at home a higher regard for the larger interests of the country. Any local or petty differences will be reconciled in the effort to promote the national welfare. These considerations will inevitably tend to a stronger centralization of authority in the hands of the Federal Administration. The possibility of a conflict with a friendly power because of some state school law or the jeopardizing of millions of property on account of sectional prejudice against the yellow race, will be removed when the national jurisdiction over such matters is not defied. A deeper study of foreign institutions will show that our own views are not always indisputably correct; not only in the executive but likewise in the judicial branch similar effects will be noticed. With the growth of litigation involving interests in the dependencies, attention will more and more be paid to precedents of alien origin and to this extent the rules laid down by the Courts will draw their doctrines from the broader principles of fundamental equity which partake of an international character. Through Cuba, the Philippines and Porto Rico, a stronger tinge of Spanish law will be imparted to our jurisprudence. Such changes, far from being detrimental, must inevitably impress us with a more liberal conception of our duties as a nation.

The United States has, within eight years, advanced with giant strides, for it the era of isolation is closed; its people have begun to take a lively part in the wider interests of humanity; its opinion on a vast variety of subjects has been expressed, welcomed and respected by the great powers of which it has suddenly become one. With the acquisition of dependencies the nation has not only been brought face to face with problems purely incidental to them, but it has likewise learned that the assumption of these obligations involves as a necessary correlary, manifold duties toward other states.

While its fleets operate on the farther waters of the Western Sea, its statesmen and diplomats do not forget to confer and debate with their contemporaries to the East of the Atlantic. And here emphasis may well be laid upon the transition of which we have lately been witnesses; the step which, coincident with the opening of the twentieth century, will probably mark the advent of a new wage. As the mediæval era was finally closed with the frequent navigation of the Atlantic by Europeans, so another epoch terminated when the United States and Japan began to compete for the mastery of the Pacific. The scepter of power then passed from the shores of the Mediterranean; so now the Eastern fringe of the Atlantic is apparently destined soon to lose its supremacy; for the United States at least the outlook is toward the Occident. If in council the nations of Europe still rule, the field of action lies in Asia; the East has become the West.

One of the most important doctrines of American policy, it is felt by many, is jeopardized by the expansion of American interests. The Monroe Doctrine as well as the protective tariff, our distinguished fellow-citizen Professor John W. Burgess considers doomed to annihilation. In his address at the University of Berlin last October he said:

“There are, for instance, two tenets which have almost come to be looked upon as sacred as articles of faith in American politics the abandonment of which no outside power could even dare to hint at without danger of arousing the enmity of the Union. I refer to the protective tariff and the Monroe Doctrine.

“Our politicians seem not to have the slightest appreciation of the fact that both these political tenets have almost got to be antiquated, that the political, geographical and constitutional changes among the powers of Europe, as well as the assumption by the United States of its place as a world-power, have rendered both almost meaningless.”

May it not well be questioned whether our policy will be changed to the extent that Professor Burgess seems to anticipate? Of the other nations, those the more deeply interested in similar problems of expansion have sufficient work to do for coming centuries. If in the past we have barred the en-



try of European states to the American Continent, we have, on the other hand, repeatedly manifested our good faith and disinterestedness in disavowing any intention whatever to extend our own sovereignty. There has been no cause for jealousy or envy. With all due regard to the possibilities of our future growth as a nation in strength and authority, there is not any apparent reason why we should abandon the faith of our fathers. While maintaining indeed the authority of the Monroe Doctrine in its application to Central and South America, it is likely that we shall formulate some analogous theory of non-intervention in the affairs of the Pacific. The older policy may well be extended in principle so as to apply to the new and wider conditions of our national life.

While always taking pride in our peace-loving disposition, we Americans have fought bloody conflicts and won great triumphs at arms; even now, while planning the construction of the most powerful battleships and an increase in military armament—both the inevitable consequences of widely scattered possessions—we are ready to submit our contentions with foreign powers to an international tribunal and are participating both in South America and in the North of Europe in the deliberations of conferences designed to minimize the chances of war and to relieve such conflicts, when they occur, of their worst horrors. Without our outlying dependencies would these discussions have had the same interest for us? In our broader relationships with other states, in our wider view of humanity, in the development of more liberal policies,—especially in commercial connections—and in the newly created outlets for our energies, both in military and civil life, the control of dependencies is working in our national fabric innumerable moral, social, intellectual, economic and political changes. Some influences are undoubtedly beneficial, others may be detrimental. It behooves us, therefore, as a people by introspection and reflection carefully to observe and study these phenomena; while we weigh and examine them let us not forget the fate of other nations! The discussion of the effects of outlying dependencies upon people of the United States, their institutions and policies is, therefore, peculiarly appropriate at this time.